In this paper we introduce a new procedure called α -Discounting Method for MultiCriteria Decision Making (α-D MCDM), which is as an alternative and extension of Saaty's Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP). It works for any number of preferences that can be transformed into a system of homogeneous linear equations. A degree of consistency (and implicitly a degree of inconsistency) of a decision-making problem are defined. α-D MCDM is generalized to a set of preferences that can be transformed into a system of linear and/or non-linear homogeneous and/or non-homogeneous equations and/or inequalities. Many consistent, weak inconsistent, and strong inconsistent examples are given.
For consistent decision-making problems with pairwise comparisons, α-Discounting Method together with the Fairness Principle give the same result as AHP. But for weak inconsistent decision-making problem, α -Discounting together with the Fairness Principle give a different result from AHP. α-Discounting/Fairness-Principle together give a justifiable result for strong inconsistent decision-making problems with two preferences and two criteria; but for more than two preferences with more than two criteria and the Fairness Principle has to be replaced by another principle of assigning numerical values to all parameters α's.
Since Saaty's AHP is not the topic of this paper, we only recall the main steps of applying this method, so the results of α-D MCDM and of AHP could be compared. AHP works only for pairwise comparisons of criteria, from which a square Preference Matrix, A (of size n× n), is built. Then one computes the maximum eigenvalue λ max of A and its corresponding eigenvector. If λ max is equal to the size of the square matrix, then the decision-making problem is consistent, and its corresponding normalized eigenvector (Perron-Frobenius vector) is the priority vector. If λ max is strictly greater than the size of the square matrix, then the decision-making problem is inconsistent. One raise to the second power matrix A, and again the resulted matrix is raised to the second power, etc. obtaining the sequence of matrices A 2 , A 4 , A 8 , …, etc. In each case, one computes the maximum eigenvalue and its associated normalized eigenvector, until the difference between two successive normalized eigenvectors is smaller than a given threshold. The last such normalized eigenvector will be the priority vector. We need to find all variables x i in accordance with the set of preferences P. Thus, we get an m ˟ n linear homogeneous system of equations whose associated matrix is A = (a ij ), 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In order for this system to have non-null solutions, the rank of the matrix A should be strictly less than n.
2.2.
Classification of Linear Decision-Making Problems. a) We say that a linear decision-making problem is consistent if, by any substitution of a variable x i from an equation into another equation, we get a result in agreement with all equations. b) We say that a linear decision-making problem is weakly inconsistent if by at least one substitution of a variable x i from an equation into another equation we get a result in disagreement with at least another equation in the following ways: (WD1)-(WD3) are weak disagreements, in the sense that for example a variable x > y always, but with different ratios (for example: x=3y and x=5y).
All disagreements in this case should be like (WD1)-(WD3).
c) We say that a linear decision-making problem is strongly inconsistent if, by at least one substitution of a variable x i from an equation into another equation, we get a result in disagreement with at least another equation in the following way:
with 0 < k 1 < 1 < k 2 or 0 < k 2 < 1 < k 1 (i.e. from one equation one gets x i < x j while from the other equation one gets the opposite inequality: x j < x i ).
At least one inconsistency like (SD4) should exist, no matter if other types of inconsistencies like (WD1)-(WD3) may occur or not.
Compute the determinant of A. a) If det(A)=0, the decision problem is consistent, since the system of equations is dependent. It is not necessarily to parameterize the system. {In the case we have parameterized, we can use the Fairness Principle -i.e. setting all parameters equal α 1 = α 2 = … = α p = α > 0}.
Solve this system; find its general solution.
Replace the parameters and secondary variables, getting a particular solution. Normalize this particular solution (dividing each component by the sum of all components). Wet get the priority vector (whose sum of its components should be 1). b) If det(A) ≠ 0, the decision problem is inconsistent, since the homogeneous linear system has only the null-solution. b1) If the inconsistency is weak, then parameterize the right-hand side coefficients, and denote the system matrix A(α).
Compute det(A(α)) = 0 in order to get the parametric equation.
If the Fairness Principle is used, set all parameters equal, and solve for α > 0.
Replace α in A(α ) and solve the resulting dependent homogeneous linear system. Similarly as in a), replace each secondary variable by 1, and normalize the particular solution in order to get the priority vector. b2)
If the inconsistency is strong, the Fairness Principle may not work properly. Another approachable principle might be designed. Or, get more information and revise the strong inconsistencies of the decision-making problem.
Comparison between AHP and α-D MCDM:
a) α-D MCDM's general solution includes all particular solutions, that of AHP as well; b) α-D MCDM uses all kind of comparisons between criteria, not only paiwise comparisons; c) for consistent problems, AHP and α-D MCDM/Fairness-Principle give the same result; d) for large inputs, in α-D MCDM we can put the equations under the form of a matrix (depending on some parameters alphas), and then compute the determinant of the matrix which should be zero; after that, solve the system (all can be done on computer using math software); the software such as MATHEMATICA and MAPPLE for example can do these determinants and calculate the solutions of this linear system; e) α-D MCDM can work for larger classes of preferences, i.e. preferences that can be transformed in homogeneous linear equations, or in non-linear equations and/or inequalitiessee more below.
2.4.
Generalization of α -D MCDM. Let each preference be expressed as a linear or non-linear equation or inequality. All preferences together will form a system of linear/non-linear equations/inequalities, or a mixed system of equations and inequalities. Solve this system, looking for a strictly positive solution (i.e. all unknowns x i > 0). Then normalize the solution vector.
If there are more such numerical solutions, do a discussion: analyze the normalized solution vector in each case. If there is a general solution, extract the best particular solution by replacing the secondary variables by some numbers such that the resulting particular solution is positive, and then normalizing. If there is no strictly positive solution, parameterize the coefficients of the system, find the parametric equation, and look for some principle to apply in order to find the numerical values of the parametersα 's . A discussion might also be involved. We may get undetermined solutions.
Degrees of Consistency and Inconsistency inα -D MCDM/Fairness-Principle.
For α -D MCDM/Fairness-Principle in consistent and weak consistent decision-making problems, we have the followings: a) If 0 < α < 1, then α is the degree of consistency of the decision-making problem, and β = 1-α is the degree of inconsistency of the decision-making problem. b) If α > 1, then 1/α is the degree of consistency of the decision-making problem, and β = 1-1/α is the degree of inconsistency of the decision-making problem. Another idea herein is to set a threshold of consistency t c (or implicitly a threshold of inconsistency t i ). Then, if the degree of consistency is smaller than a required t c , the Fairness Principle or Expert's Opinion (whichever was used) should be discharged, and another principle of finding all parameters α 's should be designed; and similarly if the degree of inconsistency is bigger than t i . c) One may measure the system's accuracy (or error) for the case when all m preferences can be transformed into equations; for example, preference P i is transformed into an equation f i (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n )=0; then we need to find the unknowns x 1 , x 2 , …, x n such that:
Principles of α-D MCDM (Second Part
where "e(…)" means error. Calculus theory (partial derivatives) can be used to find the minimum (if this does exist) of a function of n variables, e(x 1 , x 2 , …, x n ), with e: R + n  R + . For consistent decision-making problems the system's accuracy/error is zero, so we get the exact result. We prove this through the fact that the normalized priority vector [a 1 a 2 … a n ], where x i =a i > 0 for all i, is a particular solution of the system f i (x 1 , x 2 , …, x n )=0 for i=1, 2, …, m; therefore:
But, for inconsistent decision-making problems we find approximations for the variables.
Extension of α-D MCDM (Non-Linear α-D MCDM).
It is not difficult to generalize the α-D MCDM for the case when the preferences are non-linear homogeneous (or even non-homogeneous) equations. This non-linear system of preferences has to be dependent (meaning that its general solution -its main variables -should depend upon at least one secondary variable). If the system is not dependent, we can parameterize it in the same way. Then, again, in the second part of this Non-Linear α-D MCDM we assign some values to each of the secondary variables (depending on extra-information we might receive), and we also need to design a principle which will help us to find the numerical values for all parameters. We get a particular solution (such extracted from the general solution), which normalized will produce our priority vector. Yet, the Non-Linear α-D MCDM is more complicated, and depends on each non-linear decisionmaking problem.
Let us see some examples. 6. Consistent Example 1.
We use the α-D MCDM. Let the Set of Preferences be: { }
1, 2, 3 C C C , and The Set of Criteria be:
1. 1 C is 4 times as important as 2 C . 2.
2 C is 3 times as important as 3. C 3.
3 C is one twelfth as important as 1
The linear homogeneous system associated to this decision-making problem is:
, whence det(A 1 ) = 0, so the DM problem is consistent.
Solving this homogeneous linear system we get its general solution that we set as a solution vector [12z 3z z], where z can be any real number (z is considered a secondary variable, while x=12z and y=3z are main variables). we also get the minimum of H(x,y,z) being zero, which occurs for x=12/16, y=3/16, z=1/16.
Weak Inconsistent Examples where AHP does not Work.
The Set of Preferences is { } 
AHP cannot be applied on this example because of the form of the first preference, which is not a pairwise comparison.
If we solve this homogeneous linear system of equations as it is, we get x=y=z=0, since its associated matrix is:
but the null solution is not acceptable since the sum x+y+z has to be 1. Let us parameterise each right-hand side coefficient and get the general solution of the above system: Replacing (2) and (3) in (1) we get 
whence the priority vector:
Fairness Principle: discount all coefficients with the same percentage: so, replace g(x,y) = |4x-y-3|+|x-2y|+|4x+3y-3|, with x,y∈[0,1], which represents the weak inconsistent decision-making problem's associated system:
x-2y-3z=0, x-2y=0, x-3z=0, and x+y+z=1, x>0, y>0, z>0. by solving z=1-x-y and replacing it in G(x,y,z)= |x-2y-3z|+|x-2y|+|x-3z| with x>0, y>0, z>0, Let us change Example 1 in order to study various situations. 
Weak Inconsistent
Example 3, which is more weakly inconsistent than Example 2. 1. Same as in Example 2. 2. 2 C is 4 times as important as 1 C 3. Same as in Example 2.α α α α     →         4 1 9 12 1 1 3 9 9 9 9     =        
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Each coefficient was reduced at ( )
The bigger is the inconsistency ( ) 1 β → , the bigger is the discounting ( ) 0 α → . Replacing the second and third equations of this system into the first, we get:
Weak Inconsistent
Example 4, which is even more inconsistent than Example 3. 1. Same as in Example 2. 2. Same as in Example 3. 3. 3 C is 5 times as important as 1 C .
Consistent Example 5.
which is an identity (so, no contradiction). General solution: 
Replacing the last two equations into the first we get: 
hence all coefficients were left at 1 α = (=100%) of the original ones. No discount was needed.
7.5.General Example 6.
Let us consider the general case: where 1 2 3 4 , , , 0 a a a a > Let us parameterize: Replacing the second and third equations into the first, we get: (6) 4 (7) 5
In order for α give the best result? How to measure it? This is the greatest challenge! α -Discounting Method includes all solutions (all possible priority vectors which make the matrix consistent).
Because we have to be consistent with all proportions (i.e. using the Fairness Principle of finding the parameters' numerical values), there should be the same discounting of all three proportions (5), (6) , and (7), whence 
The parametric equation (8) Why, for example, the first proportion, which was equal to 3, was discounted to 74.6867% of it, while the second proportion, which was equal to 4, was discounted to another percentage (although close) 74.7050% of it?
Even more doubt we have for the third proportion's coefficient, which was equal to 5, but was increased to 133.9100% of it, while the previous two proportions were decreased; what is the justification for these?
That is why we think our α-D/Fairness-Principle is better justified. We can solve this same problem using matrices. (5), (6), (7) can be written in another way to form a linear parameterized homogeneous system: 2.4 0 α α α − = , so we get the same parametric equation as (8) . In this case the homogeneous parameterized linear system (14) has a triple infinity of solutions.
This method is an extension of Saaty's method, since we have the possibility to manipulate the parameters 1 
We parameterized it: 
Its associated matrix is: 
The rank of matrix 2 P should be strictly less than 3 in order for the system (18) to have non-null solution.
If we take the first three rows in (19) we get the matrix 1 P , whose determinant should be zero, therefore one also gets the previous parametric equation 1 2 3 2.4α α α = . If we take rows 1, 3, and 4, since they all involve the relations between 2 C and the other criteria 1 C and 3 C we get 
whose determinant should also be zero: 
If we take 
In such situations, when we get strong contradiction of the form x>y>z>x or similarly x<z<x, etc. and the consistency is tiny, we can consider that x=y=z=1/3 (so no criterion is preferable to the other -as in Saaty's AHP), or just x+y+z=1 (which means that one has the total ignorance too: C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3).
Strong Inconsistent Example 14.
Let C = {C1, C2}, and P = {C1 is important twice as much as C2; C2 is important 5 times as much as C1}. Let m(C1)=x, m(C2)=y. Then: x=2y and y=5x (it is a strong inconsistency since from the first equation we have x>y, while from the second y>x). Parameterize: x=2α 1 y, y=5α 2 x, whence we get 2α 1 =1/(5α 2 ), or 10α 1 α 2 =1.
If we consider the Fairness Principle, then α 1 = α 2 = α>0, and one gets α = 10 10 ≈ 31.62%
consistency; priority vector is [0.39 0.61], hence y>x. An explanation can be done as in paraconsistent logic (or as in neutrosophic logic): we consider that the preferences were honest, but subjective, therefore it is possible to have two contradictory statements true simultaneously since a criterion C1 can be more important from a point of view than C2, while from another point of view C2 can be more important than C1. In our decisionmaking problem, not having any more information and having rapidly being required to take a decision, we can prefer C2, since C2 is 5 times more important that C1, while C1 is only 2 times more important than C2, and 5>2. If it's no hurry, more prudent would be in such dilemma to search for more information on C1 and C2. If we change Example 14 under the form: x=2y and y=2x (the two coefficients set equal), we get α = ½, so the priority vector is [0.5 0.5] and decision-making problem is undecidable.
Non-Linear Equation System Example 15.
Let C = {C1, C2, C3}, m(C1)=x, m(C2)=y, m(C3)=z. Let F be: 1. C1 is twice as much important as the product of C2 and C3. 2. C2 is five times as much important as C3. 
Future Research:
To investigate the connection between α-D MCDM and other methods, such as: the technique for order preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) method, the simple additive weighting (SAW) method, Borda-Kendall (BK) method for aggregating ordinal preferences, and the cross-efficiency evaluation method in data envelopment analysis (DEA).
Conclusion.
We have introduced a new method in the multi-criteria decision making, α -Discounting MCDM. In the first part of this method, each preference is transformed into a linear or non-linear equation or inequality, and all together form a system that is resolved -one finds its general solution, from which one extracts the positive solutions. If the system has only the null solution, or it is inconsistent, then one parameterizes the coefficients of the system.
In the second part of the method, one chooses a principle for finding the numerical values of the parameters {we have proposed herein the Fairness Principle, or Expert's Opinion on Discounting, or setting a Consistency (or Inconsistency) Threshold}.
